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n animal capiTal: RendeRing life in Biopolitical Times, Nicole 
Shukin calls attention to dominant North American representations 
of ecological and economic systems and suggests that the hegem-
onic framing of capitalism as a zero-waste apparatus mimes the equal-
ly common-sense model of the ecosystem as a “closed loop,” thereby 
“serv[ing] an ideological vision of capital as biopolitical totality” (70). In 
other words, mainstream discourses of ecology and capitalism appear to 
be mutually reinforcing the idea that we can create and govern systemic 
models of total efficiency. Yet this narrative effaces something crucial 
about ideal machines that we learn in high school physics: they remain 
hypothetical. As Zygmunt Bauman observes, “Where is design, there 
is waste” (30), and, as we have seen throughout the history of neolib-
eral capitalism, obsessive designing has resulted in profound systemic 
designations of economic disposability. Moreover, and perhaps more 
counterintuitively given the extent to which we have naturalized our 
model of nature, the hegemonic model of ecology is similarly fallible: 
as Timothy Morton has traced at length in Ecology without Nature and 
The Ecological Thought, the dominant conceptual apparatus of ecology 
is evidently, like capitalism, an idealized tableau of happy efficiency that 
belies its remainders and misfits.
What possibilities other than death exist for the inevitable misfits 
of such heavily idealized systems? Canadian author Helen Humphreys’s 
2004 novel Wild Dogs is preoccupied with this question. The narrative 
traces the precarious lives of a group of people in an unnamed North 
American city who have all lost their pet dogs, in one way or another, to 
a feral pack amassing in the woods at the edge of the city. The human 
characters are initially strangers but form an uneasy collective in the 
act of pacing the forest’s edge every evening and calling their dogs’ 
names. United and undone by their individual losses — their loss of 
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the dogs and consequently their perceived loss of the potential to form 
reliable relationships — the characters must find ways to rework their 
approaches to both human and interspecies relationships. Humphreys’s 
novel is a significant meditation on the inadequacy of contemporary 
hegemonic ecological and economic imaginaries: the novel forces us to 
account for everything that we might pretend these systems throw away, 
preclude, or erase, and it calls on us to reconsider our usual frameworks 
of relationship and care in the process.
Wild Dogs is not only a narrative about misfits but has also remained 
somewhat of a misfit itself in the realm of academic criticism: though 
the novel garnered a Lambda Literary Award for lesbian fiction and 
was later translated into a stage play in Toronto by Nightwood Theatre 
in 2008, it remains underread in each of the fields for which it would 
reverberate most, namely Canadian literature studies, ecocriticism, and 
animal studies.1 Alongside these fields, the novel interrogates the sup-
posed seamlessness between and within ecology and capitalism, which 
remain the primary conceptual apparatuses that we use to understand 
our collective life. Although most areas of the humanities necessarily 
continue to theorize the disposability endemic to the imaginary and 
material frameworks of neoliberalism, the fate of those lives left out of 
the normative ecological story is of particular concern in ecocriticism 
and animal studies. For instance, ecocritical theories of “queer ecology,” 
such as those of Morton and Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands, bring into 
relief the selective heteronormativity of prevailing naturalized notions 
of ecology. Meanwhile, theorists in animal studies continue the effort 
popularized by Donna Haraway and Jacques Derrida, among others, 
to deconstruct the human/animal binary that constitutively denies 
altogether the existence of misfits or the non-category that includes 
domestic animals, the largely impenetrable abyss of animal knowledge, 
and human-animal relationships premised on something other than 
sacrificial value. Wild Dogs not only renders this matrix of concerns — 
misfit concerns — in a way that productively develops models of power 
and knowledge negotiated in recent theoretical work but also gestures 
toward alternative ecologies of care.
The threat of economic disposability structures the everyday lives of 
the human characters in Wild Dogs, each of whom narrates at least one 
chapter. Alice, perhaps the novel’s “main” character, has recently broken 
up with her boyfriend, John, after he abandoned her dog Hawk at the 
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edge of the woods. She has spent her adult life moving between “jobs 
that other people see as temporary, as jobs for struggling students, as 
jobs that are beneath most ordinary folk” (29), which she experiences as 
a cumulative cycle preventing her from either landing a higher-paid pos-
ition or saving enough money for an advanced education. Alice traces 
her economic misfit status back to her first job at a carwash: 
No one had to be nice to me. That’s what I learnt at the carwash. I 
wasn’t protected by anything. Even the total slimeball who worked 
at the car-rental agency down the street could accuse me of stealing 
loose change from his ashtray and be believed. It didn’t matter that 
I was reading all the books on the university English list. What 
mattered was that working at the car wash was lower than almost 
everything else, and somehow everyone knew this. (30-31)
Her work at all of her contingent jobs has a certain use value for the 
system, but as the doer of that work, along with scores of workers in 
the globalized late capitalist regime, she is deemed by the system to 
be utterly replaceable and thus unworthy of security and protection. 
Society’s designation of Alice as disposable signals that neoliberal logic 
functions as a form of biopolitics, a form of politics that in turn oper-
ates primarily as a conceptual apparatus of security: as Michel Foucault 
famously argued, biopower is a form of governance aimed at securitiz-
ing the population(s) deemed worthy of protection, marked by “the 
emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and 
it . . . consists in making live and letting die” (Society 247). Ultimately, 
biopower relies on the aggregation and marshalling of particular kinds 
of knowledge concerning populations — knowledge that generates bio-
political norms capable of sorting lives worthy of protection from lives 
that we as a society should either “let die” or exclude more vigorously 
(kill) in the very name of protecting the lives that matter.2
Other characters share Alice’s economic misfit status and thus find 
themselves beyond the protective border of neoliberal biopolitics. For 
Malcolm, a recluse who has also lost his pet dog to the feral pack, 
mental illness occasions his withdrawal from the economy and from 
human community, and he lives alone in a farmhouse filled with his 
dead mother’s antiques. Lily’s position is also marked by disposability 
because of disability: Lily has suffered brain damage in a fire and sub-
sequently seems to lose status as a recognized subject worthy of being 
nurtured. Her only human company is the loose pack of people who 
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assemble nightly to call their dogs; when she goes missing, neither her 
parents nor the authorities seem to know or care about any details of her 
life, and her parents speculate that perhaps she has killed herself (52). 
Lily’s lack of standing in the oikos figuring a concomitant lack of status 
in the broader economy — à la Gregor in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis — 
is reiterated in several other characters. Walter is relegated to the base-
ment after his wife dies because his grown daughter and her husband 
worry that Walter’s little dog will threaten the safety of their baby, thus 
demonstrating how important the logics of futurity and speculation are 
to an often exclusionary discourse of long-term protection and security. 
Ironically, however, the somewhat abstract figure of “the child” whom 
we recognize from this ideology of futurity3 does not always procure 
protection for actual youths, who instead are often treated as dispos-
able threats to the efficient functioning of the neoliberal economy, as 
Henry Giroux and others have persuasively argued.4 Teenaged Jamie 
is this latter kind of figure in the novel, defined by society at large as 
destined for delinquency and viewed by his stepfather as a worthless yet 
threatening presence in the family home and thus always as a potential 
target of violence.
Significantly, though, Humphreys does not frame economic dispos-
ability as a condition affecting only a smattering of misfits; rather, her 
central characters’ lives unfold against a backdrop of systemic precarity 
that infuses the whole city, radiating outward from the now-shuttered 
furniture factory that was the city’s economic heart. Alice’s father’s dis-
missal from the factory after a disabling work accident is echoed years 
later in the mass layoffs that follow the factory’s closure, swallowing 
the livelihoods of seemingly innumerable men in the main characters’ 
lives, such as Alice’s ex-boyfriend, John, and most of Jamie’s friends’ 
parents, including Spencer, a character whose economic despair becomes 
pivotal in the novel. As David Harvey argues, the unanchored structure 
of neoliberal finance and its consequent ability to capitalize on succes-
sive crises by various mechanisms of “accumulation by dispossession” 
have created an economic system in which virtually no one is able to 
feel secure. Understanding this ideology of neoliberalism — dog eat 
dog, kill or be killed, “there is no alternative,” et cetera — as a kind 
of tautological, self-fulfilling discourse concerned with scrambling for 
security in vain, and at all costs, is a key feature of Foucault’s articula-
tion of neoliberalism as a biopolitical regime of “veridiction,” in which 
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economic ideology has become implemented in such a pervasive way 
that the only measure of worth left considering is whether a given action 
or actor is economically viable (Birth 32). Alice notes the ubiquity of 
this biopolitical stance, declaring that “It has always surprised me how 
much people buy into appearances, how they don’t try to see beyond 
a uniform or a position” (29). Repeatedly in Wild Dogs, this regime of 
veridiction seems to “prove” itself on the backs of the misfits: they must 
not be worthy of the system’s consideration if they cannot succeed on 
the system’s terms.
Eventually, we see the limit case of this deadly logic in Spencer’s 
actions. Unemployed while his wife works, Spencer is yet another eco-
nomic misfit. The neoliberal shift to a feminized service economy locks 
him into a role that he never intended to play: “It pisses me off to have 
her out there earning our living and then coming home and giving me 
shit. . . . I was never meant to be a housewife” (130). Spencer is also part 
of a group of local men who decide to go into the woods to hunt the 
pack of wild dogs in an attempt to address the real threat that the dogs 
pose to the area’s livestock. The hunters do find the pack in the woods 
and kill several of the dogs. It also becomes clear that Lily has decided to 
join the dog pack herself, and Spencer shoots and kills her in the midst 
of the melee. Spencer and his fellow hunters are emblematic of the fact 
that neoliberal biopolitics is a field of power relations in which everyone 
participates, not just the state: everyone is made to feel responsible for 
deciding who is worthy and who needs to be eliminated from the game. 
Ian Baucom argues that this form of biopolitical logic was generated in 
tandem with the rise of late capitalism and the disciplinary skills that it 
requires: we all need to learn how to assess and speculate on each other’s 
level of risk and thus worth. We are all to some extent, even the misfits, 
insurance agents — participants in a “speculative epistemology . . . by 
which value detaches itself from the life of things and rearticulates itself 
in the novelistic theater of the typicalizing imagination” (106). In other 
words, neoliberal biopolitics prioritizes our ability to see and act on 
“types” of others whom we encounter.
Along these lines, Spencer’s account of Lily’s death reveals the kill-
ing to be primarily an act of biopolitical management, analogous to 
the sorting logic deployed by the economic system that has rendered 
Spencer a misfit: “It wasn’t a dog. I think I knew that from the begin-
ning. But it was wild. I knew that too” (133). For him, the only way to 
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protect himself is to discern and then eliminate “the wild,” that which 
threatens his hope of retaining some agency within the system: “Is the 
only choice either to be the wild thing or to shoot at the wild thing? I 
think so. There is no living safely with wildness. If you let a wild thing 
into your house, it tears everything to pieces” (136). It is clear that 
Spencer has internalized the thoroughly naturalized zero sum narrative 
of biopolitical survival and security that runs through our common 
imaginations of both the economy and ecology: eat or be eaten. Yet his 
drive to cleanse his life of wildness renders this common-sense narra-
tive increasingly difficult to accept without question, especially when 
he admits that, deep down, he knows that “I shot the girl, not because I 
thought she was a dog, but because I knew she was a woman” (136). In 
one sense, Spencer’s admission is a textbook illustration of what Carol J. 
Adams has been arguing for decades — and unfortunately still needs to 
— concerning patriarchal culture’s obsessive transubstantiation of “ani-
mal” and “female” signs as a means of objectifying and doing violence 
to both (see Adams). Yet it is also potentially illuminating to consider 
the statement from the perspective of neoliberal biopolitics and its influ-
ence on how we understand both “nature” and the economy. Certainly, 
Spencer has a particular problem with women since his emasculation is 
central to his disposability in the economic system. However, his state-
ment also illustrates how particular forms of hatred and fear become 
uncritically subsumed in the supposedly indiscriminate substitutability 
of “wildness” that forms a key part of the logic of neoliberal biopolitics: 
ostensibly, any being falling below perceived utility for the system at any 
given moment might be deemed disposable. In other words, in Spencer 
we gain a palpable education in how dominant economic ideology func-
tions to naturalize biopolitical exclusions and preferences. Femaleness 
might be the relevant “wild threat” for Spencer, but dog eat dog is 
understood to be the general rule, and there is not supposed to be any 
remainder. In other words, in our popular understanding of both ecol-
ogy and the economy, we are supposed to do whatever is necessary 
to survive, and we are supposed to assume that, when it comes to the 
“circle of life” known as survival, it is not personal, it is just lunch.
In light of this characteristic of the hegemonic model of ecology — 
its function as an alibi for neoliberal biopolitics — it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to continue framing the ecological sphere as a restorative 
refuge from the utterly flawed relational system of neoliberal economics. 
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The impulse to do so, however, is still understandable: since, as Shukin 
describes, we tend to figure ecology as an ideal, “closed loop” system 
in which everything nourishes and is nourished by something else, it 
remains easy for Humphreys to present “nature” as an alternative sanc-
tuary for misfits, situated literally and figuratively outside the city. Lily 
briefly experiences nature in this way when she becomes part of the dog 
pack. Yet, as Spencer illustrates, Humphreys more often thwarts such 
a move: he might begin the day of the hunt revelling in his oneness 
with nature, experiencing “[m]y body in the body of the world” (129), 
but the ensuing killing shatters this sense of harmony and purity. It is 
already clear in the novel that the contemporary economy is producing 
misfits that cannot easily be recuperated for sunny functionality, but 
Humphreys is evidently also interested in probing the misfit remainders 
of ecology. Throughout Wild Dogs, she dwells with the misfits of this 
model of ecology in three interlinked ways: she refrains from pretending 
that we can ever separate the economy from ecology for our idealizing 
purposes in the first place; she refuses to skim over or euphemize the 
rupturing violences that help to constitute ecology’s much-romanticized 
holism; and, perhaps most importantly, she simply affirms the existence 
and experiences of those left out of the typical ecological narrative.
Humphreys’s attention to the entanglement of economy and ecology 
situates her work as a response to the originary claims of Canada’s settler 
ideology, in which nature and money have often tended to figure each 
other in an overly neat and confident manner. Humphreys perhaps most 
explicitly invokes this legacy in a different work, “Natural History,” a 
series of vignettes published in Queen’s Quarterly that I will only briefly 
discuss here. She begins the series with a text box labelled “Beaver” 
comprised of two charts: “Hudson’s Bay Company Standard of Trade, 
1706,” listing the number of pelts that one should trade for items such 
as “6 dozen metal buttons” (114); and “Value of Furs,” which provides 
guidelines for the value of various pelts relative to that of the beaver, 
such as “4 wolf for 1 beaver” (115). Yet the stories that follow “Beaver” 
belie the easy economic equations of early Canadian commerce and 
illustrate how the obvious co-implication of ecology and economy is 
hardly a ground for concluding that the systems are ideal machines 
that we need not question or that they ever were. Instead, Humphreys 
renders our participation in North America’s rich ecosystems — and 
even our utter dependence on them — with deep ambivalence rather 
Helen Humphreys 305
than the “it is what it is” sensibility that tends to imbue our current 
concept of ecological interdependence. The vignette “American Robin,” 
for instance, illustrates that not even bare necessity is sufficient to erase 
a boy’s conflicted feelings about the robins that he and his brother need 
to hunt for the survival of their family: his mother tells him sacrificial 
folklore about the robins, but this “does not stop him from wanting to 
free the bird somehow from death” (118). Such ambivalence departs 
from our commonplace attitude toward the ecological fact that beings 
kill one another for food; as I have argued elsewhere (see Carey), more 
representative of our culture’s response to the predator-prey relationship 
is prominent animal welfarist Temple Grandin’s justification of animal 
agriculture by comparing it favourably with the ecological alternative 
of “hav[ing] my guts ripped out by coyotes or lions while I was still 
conscious” (235). My argument is not that ecological interdependence 
is untrue or escapable but that the totalizing manner in which we cur-
rently exonerate the violence endemic in ecological relationships — to 
the extent that anyone trying to interrogate the ethical quandaries of 
such violence, such as vegetarians, are popularly accused of “a denial 
of reality that can be its own form of hubris” (Pollan 362) — is both a 
symptom of and a licence for our naturalized acceptance of the dog-eat-
dog violence of neoliberal capitalism.
Perhaps fittingly, the characters in Wild Dogs that provoke the 
most examination along these lines are the dogs themselves. In The 
Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness, 
Donna Haraway articulates what has become a basic premise in animal 
studies for the analysis of human-animal relationships: “Dogs are not 
an alibi for other themes. . . . [Dogs] are not here just to think with. 
They are here to live with” (5). Evidently, Humphreys agrees: the pet/
feral dogs at the centre of the novel are not mere symbols of what hap-
pens to the human characters; they participate in the relational ecol-
ogy of the narrative on their own terms. Relationships between the 
humans and the dogs are tangible and substantial, to the extent that, 
when the humans go into the woods to look for Lily, Alice admits 
that they are equally interested in finding the dogs (60). At the same 
time, however, the dogs are also figuratively crucial to understanding 
the problems that I have been tracing with our current imaginaries of 
ecology and economy since they live and die at the fraught intersec-
tion of these two figurative and material apparatuses. To be sure, what 
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happens to the dogs reinforces and develops the novel’s meditation on 
economic disposability: they begin as pets deemed worthy of protec-
tion and material comforts such as walks, sharing human beds, sausage 
rolls, and dog treats; however, once they become feral, the same dogs 
are understood by society, if not by their former owners, as a disposable 
threat. Significantly, their disposability becomes material reality for 
them — they are hunted down and exterminated — once they begin to 
kill livestock. Ecologically, they are “just” killing for food; economically, 
they are the threat, and the livestock are the beings worthy of protection 
(for the time being, of course).
Once more, though, Humphreys implies that perhaps we should not 
let our notions of ecology off the hook in our haste to condemn the vio-
lences of the economy. The dogs also engender intense reflection in the 
human characters on the violent nature of nature. Above I noted that 
the dogs were “just” killing for food, and the quotation marks are neces-
sary because there is a current of dis-ease concerning eating that runs 
through Wild Dogs. Just as in “American Robin,” the ecological neces-
sity of killing for food does not place the practice above reproach or at 
least above ambivalence and contemplation. The pain of such violence, 
especially for the “eaten” and those immediately adjacent to the “eaten” 
in the ecological web, is not so easily reconciled. For instance, immedi-
ately after Alice recounts her experience of economic disposability at the 
car wash, she tells another story from the same period in her life about 
the dryers at a nearby laundromat being used solely to process pigs’ ears 
into dog chews. Her anecdote not only confronts us with the fact that 
our mundane indulgence of ecology expressed in producing dog chews 
depends on pails “full of pink triangles of flesh, bloody and with coarse 
blond hairs still stuck to them” (32), but also indicates that it is difficult 
to separate the violence of a dog’s apparently ecological habit of chewing 
on a pig’s ears from the violence of the economy that chews up and spits 
out Alice. Both are presumed to be a matter of course in contemporary 
society; neither is so in the hands of Humphreys.
Even Spencer, who yearns for immersion into the predator-prey ecol-
ogy of hunting, finds that he cannot fully rationalize its violent con-
sequences: “I wasn’t keen to kill them, but I was keen to hunt them. 
Sometimes you forget one thing in the shadow of the other. You forget 
that hunting is about killing. So . . . I tried to be reverent about know-
ing this was the last morning they would spend on this earth. That’s 
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what a good hunter does. He has respect for what he kills. He even 
feels sad that he has to kill it. But the killing of the dogs was set in 
place by the act of hunting” (131). Here Spencer frames hunting as a 
straightforward sequence of causal steps — a narrative — that never-
theless carries embedded within it something that resists the terms of 
that narrative, something that he is not “keen” to think about or even 
remember: the death of the animal. The story of ecology is evidently 
simple — beings need to die to keep the cycle of nourishment going — 
but an inscrutable excess rankles; there is a sense that this narrative is 
too limited to capture everything happening affectively, ethically, and 
even just materially in animal lives, human and otherwise.
Characters continue to identify — and identify as — misfits of the 
common-sense model of ecology throughout Wild Dogs. Jamie, for 
instance, who reminds Alice of a large dog “constantly trying to insert 
himself into the landscape” (25), nonetheless feels alienated from the 
ecological narrative offered by his teacher: “Fight or flight, that’s how 
one of my teachers described different animals. . . . I can’t seem to 
run or fight. I don’t know what sort of animal that makes me” (100). 
In other words, in terms of his teacher’s ecological story (and since he 
is evidently not yet lunch), Jamie remains only in the mode of being 
excluded from the story altogether. Lest we conclude that the remain-
ders of the ecological story are exclusively human, however, which would 
undoubtedly open the door to a recuperation of the standing-ready man/
nature divide of human exceptionalism, there are several key examples 
of non-human animals seemingly exceeding the frame set by the typical 
ideological tableau of ecology. Watching a heron waiting patiently for 
a fish to swim by, Alice admits to “wanting the story to go the way it 
should, for effort to be rewarded” (66); here we not only see the con-
structed character of the “story” of ecological predator-prey relations 
but also hear the resonance, again, between the ideological promises of 
neoliberal economics and those of the go-to ecological model. Yet Alice 
observes how often the story does not “go the way it should,” noting 
that “[t]here is sometimes no reward for patience” (66). Turning her 
focus to a school of fish in a nearby river, she meditates further on the 
unexpected remainders and excesses of ecology’s predator-prey story. 
She observes the fish forming a wheel shape that enables their collective 
surveillance of their surroundings, only to be attacked from above by an 
osprey. On the one hand, her conclusion that “[d]eath waits just beyond 
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the danger we can imagine” (67) merely describes the basic condition 
for successful predation in an ecosystem; on the other, the evocative 
phrasing situates death beyond any definitive ability to understand the 
dynamics of ecological predation, beyond even humanity’s masterful 
scientific imagination,5 thus recalling Spencer’s deep ambivalence con-
cerning killing animals. 
In other words, Alice frames death itself as a kind of misfit of ecol-
ogy. Moreover, it appears to be so not only in the metaphysical sense 
that we might assume she means and then dismiss; in fact, Alice is 
interested in moments at which death does not seem to serve an eco-
logical purpose — the ways that death becomes a misfit according to 
the very terms of the ecological story that posits death as the constitutive 
condition for nourishment. She observes dead fish in the water just as 
“something starts eating the dead fish from the water side” (67). On “the 
water side” of their bodies, the fish are fulfilling the ecological nourish-
ment story: “They are being consumed by the world they inhabited” 
(67). Yet Alice is equally intrigued by what is happening on the other 
side of the dead bodies: “in the world they visit — that flat, blank sky 
above them — they float undisturbed. The fish never had a desire to be 
here, and this world has no desire to taste them now” (67-68). Unlike 
the typical sacrificial discourse in which we recuperate all animal death 
for an ecological purpose, it seems that Alice wishes to consider the idea 
that “purpose” and violent death might not be entirely co-extensive, that 
the sacrificial equation might not be as neat as it looks. This possibility 
reverberates as she next observes a raccoon eating a fish, and, “just as it 
seems he’s enjoying his meal, the raccoon stops eating, lays the fish at 
the base of the tree, and scrambles away into the woods. There was no 
danger. No other animals approached him. There was no sound from 
me. He hadn’t eaten enough to be full” (68). Again, animals seemingly 
resist fully playing the roles set out for them in the typical predator-prey 
story: the food is left uneaten for no intelligible reason.6
Of course, in one sense, this is too broad and too individualized a 
reading of ecology; after all, the fish will nourish something else if not 
that raccoon, or at the least its body will give nutrients to the soil, and so 
on. But these facts are somewhat to the side of the point that I am trying 
to make: it is not that ecology is not, for the most part, a circle of life, 
that nutrients are not endlessly recycled, but that the limited ways in 
which we tend to represent these processes and then map them onto the 
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imaginaries of our collective life end up papering over too many of the 
aspects of life that are just as real as mutual consumption: senselessness, 
loss, futility, joy, play, the abysses of love — these all become misfits if 
they are not legible in terms of purpose.7 Rather than seeing it as one 
relationship among many, in key respects we have normatively elevated 
the predator-prey relationship to an all-encompassing metanarrative that 
we pretend is sufficient to validate both our economic system and our 
place in the world. In fact, the model is glaringly incomplete. Alice’s 
lover, Rachel, a wildlife biologist, suggests as much when she opines, 
The truth of our communion with nature is the bird lifting from 
the branch, the white of the deer’s tail as it bounds away into the 
undergrowth. We make a story up to connect all these fugitive 
glimpses together. The story might not be true at all, but the 
moments are, and somehow we find it unbearable to live with just 
the moment. (173)
Given what we witness in Wild Dogs, it seems that we “find it 
unbearable to live with just the moment” for at least two major reasons 
— beyond the fact that we humans seem to love a good story, a grand 
model. First, the “story” itself does violence to our lived moments, mak-
ing many of them painful to inhabit. Although, as Morton reminds 
us in The Ecological Thought, “All that we call Nature is mutation and 
often pointless” (44), the biopolitical regimes of economic and eco-
logical “health” persist in categorizing whole segments of population as 
disposable, with the accompanying detrimental effects for those lives.8 
Second, to distinguish for a moment the ecological story that we con-
struct from the predator-prey relations that evidently happen regardless 
of our attempts to rationalize them, it is important to dwell on a point 
raised by Spencer and other characters in the novel: just because death is 
apparently necessary in nature, the pain and confusion that it causes for 
both the dying and the surviving are no more sensible or indeed bear-
able for that. As animal studies theorist H. Peter Steeves has recently 
argued,
Such means of gaining nutrition — such means of living — 
developed because they were possible. Nature explores any possi-
bility it can get its hands on. . . . I could have designed a nicer world 
than this one — perhaps with less diversity and perhaps with less 
imaginative flourish, but definitely with less blood and suffering, a 
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world where everyone photosynthesizes, for instance, and nothing 
stalks and murders anything else. It isn’t hard to imagine a better 
life. But this is not the way of nature. (200)
Ultimately, it seems, ecology does not provide any supreme justifica-
tions; no wonder that we “make up” stories to explain ecology, for we 
are left to make sense — moment to joyful or unbearable moment — of 
this non-sensical world that we inhabit.
Generally, then, Wild Dogs is concerned with how to go on living in 
a condition of having been left behind, whether by the economy or by 
ecology. It is in this respect that the novel resonates most strongly with 
recent theories of queer ecology; for instance, the reworking of melan-
cholia by Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands is also an attempt to theorize 
how we might deal with ecology’s remainders otherwise, beyond the 
scope of the official narrative. She articulates an approach to ethics in 
which disposability becomes a cause of reflection and ethical engage-
ment rather than ignored or treated as a condition that we need to get 
over or accept, arguing that “[p]articularly in a context in which certain 
lives are considered ungrievable . . . melancholia represents a holding-on 
to loss in defiance of bourgeois (and capitalist) imperatives to forget, 
move on, transfer attention to a new relationship/commodity” (354). 
Here, rather than recuperated back into the smooth circle of life, the 
losses of those deemed disposable stubbornly persist in us, constituting 
us in a manner that potentially “propels a changed understanding of the 
present” (333). No easy task, to be sure: in Wild Dogs, Rachel signals 
the anxiety inherent in working from the position of the left behind, 
observing a dead fox on the road and its living companion who evi-
dently “didn’t quite know what to do except to keep this uneasy vigil 
over the body of its mate” (168). She remarks that “[t]his is what love 
makes possible. This is how it can end up and this is why it is to be 
feared. I never want to be that fox. I never want to feel that pain. And I 
am not talking about the dead fox, but the living one” (168-69). Yet the 
main characters’ loss of their dogs is the crisis point that requires these 
characters to explore new approaches to their relationships with others, 
because it forces them to confront, finally, the condition of having been 
left out, rendered disposable.
The fact that the loss of pet dogs is a “rock bottom” requiring a fun-
damental change in the characters’ perspectives on relationships sheds 
crucial light on the role that non-human animals play in our imaginary 
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of human disposability. In biopolitical terms, cultural discourse implies 
that even misfits, if they are human, have the biopolitical upper hand 
of knowledge — and therefore a measure of control — over the non-
human world. Humphreys limns this restoration of human mastery 
baldly with respect to Spencer, as we have seen, and equally so with 
both Alice’s ex, John, whose frustration with his unemployment and 
unstable relationship with Alice provokes him to drive Hawk out to 
the woods, and Jamie’s equally insecure stepfather, who, according to 
Jamie, has decided that “[t]he dog had to go because I loved him and 
my stepfather’s hatred of me had to be the strongest thing in the house” 
(95). Yet Humphreys also traces the extent to which our biopolitical 
presumptions about non-human lives are not always malicious; rather, 
such presumptions are often a constitutive aspect of care.
The love that is possible between humans and dogs has inspired 
much theorizing by animal studies scholars such as Haraway, Marjorie 
Garber, Alice Kuzniar, and Susan McHugh, among others. Such work 
often explores the potential for a profusion of affects that could resist 
or rewrite the heteronormative policing of desire and care. For instance, 
Kari Weil suggests that “[t]o peer into dog love is to redefine the nature 
of Eros as necessarily more than . . . if not other than the heterosex-
ual, species-specific desire of a male for a female. It is a love of family 
that expands the boundaries of family, a love that binds without dom-
ination” (96). To some extent, Wild Dogs traces the fraught process of 
initiating or even conceiving of a relationship that would bind “without 
domination,” suggesting that, under the weight of our overdetermined 
ecological and economic systems, realizing the kind of dog love that 
animal studies often champions can be a challenging process. Returning 
to Foucault, his proto-biopolitical model of “pastoral power” can help 
us to trace this difficulty. Pastoral power is “a power of care. It looks 
after the flock, it looks after the individuals of the flock, it sees to it that 
the sheep do not suffer, it goes in search of those that have strayed off 
course, and it treats those that are injured” (Security 127). Some recent 
work in animal studies has returned to the pastoral model to exam-
ine the interspecies roots of paternalism in discourses of care. Anand 
Pandian, for example, notes that “[r]elations between shepherds and 
flocks rely upon a radical difference in kind between pastors and the 
populations in their care. Flocks are made up of beings that would scat-
ter, starve, suffer, die, or simply lose their way without the careful atten-
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tion of someone else with better judgment” (86; see also Shukin, “Tense 
Animals”). Taking up the lens of pastoral power enables a reading of 
the ways in which we persist in couching our care of others — animals 
perhaps most of all — in the ability to know and predict their needs 
and desires. The main characters in Wild Dogs might not have much, 
but at least they feel that they have that power of care over their dogs, 
until the dogs thwart even those meagre expectations. As Alice realizes, 
“[o]ur mistake was in believing that they were more attached to us than 
we were to them. . . . We couldn’t imagine a world for them where we 
weren’t central” (85).
So what kind of care can f lourish in the wake of pastoral power? 
Perhaps predictably, the answers in Wild Dogs are incomplete and ten-
tative, but the characters set forth some compelling possibilities that 
can help to develop some of the ethical options currently emerging in 
relevant realms of theory. When Walter’s and Alice’s dogs inexplicably 
return, restoring the human-pet relationship, both Walter and Alice 
choose to renew these relationships in the knowledge that they can never 
really know why the dogs left or returned. In this move, the characters 
affirm a key argument of many in animal studies, such as Matthew 
Calarco, who concludes that the only hope for more ethical relations 
lies in a commitment “always to proceed agnostically and generously, 
as if we might have missed or misinterpreted the Other’s trace” (81). 
Likewise, summing up Haraway and reiterating many others working 
in animal studies and subjectivity theory more broadly, Colleen Glenney 
Boggs notes how for Haraway “Loving an animal is the ultimate kind of 
such other-love because it opens us up to the alterity of the other and the 
possibility that the reciprocity we hope for will not follow” (65). I have 
been attracted to such ideas for years: given the violent presumptions 
that license biopolitical violence, what better alternative than to try our 
best to stop presuming?
But what does this “agnostic” restraint look and feel like on a day-
to-day basis, especially since it appears that we have no hope or desire 
of ceasing to interact with each other? To understand how Wild Dogs 
sheds some light on this question, it is useful to return to the model 
of melancholia as a potentially transformative practice (see Mortimer-
Sandilands). If we read carefully the characters’ varying responses to 
the violence of the present systems, then it becomes clear that divergent 
forms of melancholia are at work, some more conducive to a changed 
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relationship with the world than others. Alice’s lover, Rachel, for 
instance, is deeply affected by past traumas, cutting herself off from 
interpersonal connections in a biopolitical attempt to protect herself. In 
this more traditional rendering of melancholia, we can see a microcosm 
of the grand narratives of ecology and economy: on both personal and 
societal levels, a perceived overarching negative determinism allergically 
crowds out the moments and experiences that are irreducible to the dog-
eat-dog model. Instead, then, the transformative form of melancholia 
that gives hope for a different future to the main characters in Wild 
Dogs depends on their refusal to get over or give up those irreducible 
moments. Perhaps it does not really sound like melancholia when Alice 
says “I don’t think any more that my life is about what has happened to 
me. It’s about what I choose to believe” (185); however, if we read her 
comment in terms of a melancholic refusal to subscribe to economic 
and ecological determinisms, then we can interpret it along such lines.
In other words, in the context of our normative imaginaries, evi-
dently “proceeding agnostically” actually requires constant decision 
making and, in fact, preferential decision making in favour of possibil-
ities that resist the overdetermined axiom that all unknowns are likely 
dangerous. In other words, implementing in the everyday the somewhat 
aporetic practice of refraining from presumption involves consciously 
making some decisions to presume against the “type” that might seem 
more secure in our usual insurance agent-like biopolitical imagination. 
For instance, once Hawk returns and Alice has to decide whether to let 
her out of her sight, she concludes, “I just have to trust that she won’t 
disappear” (184), even though she has just as much evidence that Hawk 
will leave her as that she will stay. To proceed as if the unknown is not 
hazardous is considered to be constitutively stupid in our security-driven 
culture, but several characters begin to recognize that doing so is the 
only way to preserve experiences, however small or f leeting, of some-
thing other than the threatened trauma of disposability. Humphreys 
traces this overturned presumption of stupidity with Lily, seemingly 
the only one cognitively limited enough not to see the inherent dan-
ger in going into the woods to find the dogs, yet she is unexpectedly 
welcomed into the pack, ironically remaining relatively safe until the 
group of hunters attempt to restore their normative brand of security. 
Such decisions are not limited to human experience either; for instance, 
Alice notices while watching deer feed that as prey animals most of 
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their movements seem to be governed by fear but that, as their mouths 
make contact with the grass, “[t]hey trust the world completely in that 
instant, and I can see how their enormous fear is equally balanced by 
this capacity to trust in their surroundings, and there is peace in that” 
(36). In another instance, Alice and Rachel are visited separately by a 
small bird, seemingly for no reason, and briefly “blessed with its wild 
trust” (85): the highly rational Rachel notes that “I don’t have an answer 
for that. I don’t know why the bird trusted me” (174) but admits that 
she hopes it will come back.
Throughout Wild Dogs, characters repeatedly frame the decision 
to trust others as non-sensical, lacking evidence that such trust is war-
ranted; ultimately, however, the novel tends to suggest that forging 
connections with others outside the ostensibly securitized prescrip-
tions of dog-eat-dog ecology and neoliberal biopolitics can constitute a 
lived resistance to disposability. Alice decides to trust her dog’s return, 
Jamie and his mother decide to leave his stepfather to live in a cabin 
on Malcolm’s property, and Walter moves in with Malcolm, initiat-
ing an odd cohabitation marked by a considerable measure of personal 
distance. Walter reasons that the arrangement is “[n]ot what I would 
have imagined for myself, not what I would have foreseen from the 
beginning, but right nonetheless” (158). All of this is not to deny that 
being rendered disposable can be deadly but to affirm that it is worth 
questioning why our models of social existence articulate such limited 
and reductive expectations of each other’s behaviour and our surround-
ings. Misfits, human and otherwise, are more than a mere symptom 
of the inadequacy of our conceptual systems: they are no less real than 
the systems that ignore them, and Wild Dogs provides a glimpse of a 
relational model beyond the systemic decree of ubiquitous disposability.
Notes
1 The reasons for this exclusion are not my main concern here, though I think that 
an ecocriticism scholar’s recent passing comment to me that the novel is “soapy” might be 
illuminating: possibly, the novel’s at-times sentimental prose style does not mesh with the 
desires of many in these contingent and/or emerging fields that we emphasize “authorita-
tive” narratives to articulate our critical concerns, such as J.M. Coetzee’s novels in the case 
of animal studies. Although I understand a strategic focus on potentially canonical texts, I 
am convinced that a wide range of texts deserves a place at the ecocritical and animal studies 
table, especially since these fields are part of a broader critique of our culture’s normative 
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claims about itself, including the claim that recognizably “masterful” prose — often, of 
course, a watchword for masculinist prose — is the only prose worthy of serious critique. 
2 As Foucault describes this logic, “the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or 
the degenerate, or the abnormal) is [viewed as] something that will make life in general 
healthier: healthier and purer” (Society 255).
3 I borrow this language of “futurity” primarily from Lee Edelman’s 2004 No Future: 
Queer Theory and the Death Drive, in which Edelman interrogates “the pervasive invocation 
of the Child as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value” (3-4).
4 See, for instance, Giroux’s Youth in a Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposability?, in 
which Giroux notes that, “[h]istorically, it has become commonplace for youth to be treated 
equivocally by adults as both a threat and a promise; the ambiguity that characterizes this 
mix of fear and hope has given way in the last 20 years to a much more one-sided and 
insidious view of young people as lazy, mindless, irresponsible, and even dangerous” (71). 
5 Here I am reminded of ecocritic Greg Garrard’s point that “ecology is something we 
are constituted to be likely to be wrong about most of the time” (502). 
6 Engaging with Vicki Hearne’s work on animal training, Kari Weil similarly notes 
that, “[j]ust as, in Hearne’s view, dogs and horses often reject the stories we tell about them, 
so may they reject the stories that we tell about ourselves” (61-62).
7 Here my argument echoes a similar but different list of ecological misfits offered by 
Morton: “Where does [environmental rhetoric] leave negativity, introversion, femininity, 
writing, mediation, ambiguity, darkness, irony, fragmentation, and sickness? Are these 
simply nonecological categories?” (16). 
8 Garrard has recently suggested that we not criticize the discourse of “health” into 
oblivion because there is likely no “normative framework as emotive and accessible as 
‘health’” (510) for communicating the concerns central to environmental discourse. 
Although we might agree that the rubric of health is unparalleled in its normative force, I 
maintain the necessity of critiquing it for that very reason: this critiquing is different from 
proposing that we abolish affirming any desire for health in writing about the environment; 
rather, it is a call to ensure that we always keep a critical eye on how this discourse might 
operate to exclude and/or to provide naturalizing alibis for various biopolitical norms worth 
interrogating.
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